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Evaluation of Active Labor Market Programs: 
Examples from Hungary
1. Introduction
The World Association of Personnel in Employment Security (WAPES) is convened in 
Budapest to consider the topic of'labor market information as a key function of the public 
employment service." Reliable labor market information is crucial element in maintaining a well 
functioning competitive market economy. In particular, information from the evaluation of 
active labor market programs is essential to support program management and policy 
development within public employment services.
This paper provides an overview of the important concepts involved in the evaluation of 
active labor market programs (ALMPs). Also discussed are ways that such information may be 
used for program management and policy development. Examples are provided from research 
and practice in Hungary.
2. Concepts in Evaluation
In considering evaluations of employment programs it is important to be clear about the 
distinct concepts which may be examined. In terms of program outcomes three main types are of 
interest: gross outcomes, gross impacts, and net impacts. A gross outcome is simply the mean of 
an outcome of interest among program participants. A gross impact is the difference between 
program participants and non-participants on an outcome of interest. Gross impacts are of little 
use in understanding program effectiveness, and can be misleading to program management and 
policy decisions. Net impacts are the difference between mean outcomes of a representative 
sample of program participants and an appropriate sample of persons not receiving services. 
Great care must be taken in forming the latter group which is called the comparison group. 
Proper net impact estimation can be done through random assignment in experimental studies, or 
by using statistical means to mimic the ideal of an experiment.
To firmly set distinct outcome concepts, consider a program intended to improve the 
chances of reemployment. Among program participants and the comparison group we may 
examine the rate of reemployment. Suppose that the rate of reemployment among program 
participants is 60 percent, that the observed rate among all previously unemployed is 40 percent 
and, that the rate among an appropriately chosen comparison group is 50 percent. In this 
example the program gross outcome is 60 percent, the program gross impact is 20 percent, and 
the program net impact is 10 percent.
The two most popular evaluation techniques for employment programs are performance 
monitoring— usually of gross outcomes, and net impact estimation. Net impact estimation is 
ideally conducted through classically designed field experiments. However, usually net impact
1
estimation done by a cheaper and quicker quasi-experimental method which relies on statistical 
methods to mimic an experiment.
3. Performance Monitoring
Performance monitoring of gross program outcomes is usually done as part of a 
management system with an annual cycle. The process to develop and use such a system should: 
have nation-wide involvement of all interested parties, involve clear goal setting for each 
program monitored, and have agreement on the best performance indicators of reaching goals. 1
The system should be simple. It should involve few performance indicators, and have 
clear and consistent rules for computation which can easily be done throughout the nation. 
While usually gross outcomes are measured, performance indicators should be stated in relative 
terms to facilitate cross region and cross program comparisons. The process of creating the 
system should be inclusive so as to achieve a consensus and sense of ownership which will 
promote professionalism and use of the system The performance indicators system should be 
viewed as a changeable organic process which benefits from regular periodic refinement.
A main appeal of performance monitoring is that it provides a basis for a useful 
management information system for program operations. Focus on outcomes also promotes a 
culture of cost effectiveness and professionalism among employment service staff. Usually such 
a system involves follow-up surveys so that survey skills are established. The information 
system and survey skills combine to provide and excellent foundation for further evaluation 
studies.
Problems can arise in such a system. In particular where surveys are required response 
rates are always uneven across regions. Furthermore, when high performance is required there is 
incentive for data tampering at the local level. Finally high performance also means that 
creaming in program assignment is a distinct possibility. Resulting is wasted social resources.
Monitoring performance in Hungary
To provide an example of the results of performance measurement we draw on the 
experience of Hungary where nationwide performance measurement began in January of 1994. 
Hungary is currently in the process of developing a relational data base management system for 
administration of labor market support programs. Therefore, during the first five years of 
measurement performance indicators have been computed by hand on data aggregated at the 
county level for the 20 counties in Hungary. Table 1 reports on this evidence.
l Auer (1996) provides examples of performance indicators for employment policy among 
western European countries, O'Leary (1995) provides examples from eastern Europe.
To present a simple summary of the performance measurement results we focus on a 
single type of performance measure which is available across the main active labor market 
programs. The measure summarizes the rate of reemployment. It is the percent employed after 
participation in each of the listed active labor market programs. Table 1 lists results for three 
types of retraining, self-employment, wage subsidy and public service employment (PSE) for the 
years 1994 through 1998.
Table 1. An example of performance measurement in Hungary.
Percent employed at follow-up after various ALMPs, 1994-1998.
ALMP
Group Retraining (A12)
Individual Retraining (A22)
Retraining Employed (A3 2)
Self-employment (B2)
Wage Subsidy (C2)
PSE (D2)
1994
44.9
58.5
82.2
91.9
71.1
3.5
1995
36.1
42.2
93.6
90.6
71.4
1.3
1996
44.5
51.9
92.8
90.2
70.1
1.3
1997
46.3
51.1
90.4
88.1
66.3
1.9
1998
46.8
51.5
94.7
91.7
59.1
1.9
For people participating in ALMPs, the results indicate considerable stability in 
reemployment rates across the years following each separate program. For each program the 
reemployment rate fluctuated in a narrow range during the five year period. Also, the relative 
success in gaining regular non-subsidized employment across the different programs is quite 
stable over the years. The ordering from high to low of reemployment rates remains is the same 
in every year.
In reviewing the results it must be remembered that follow-up was usually done 3 months 
after participants left the program. While this may be reasonable for retraining of the 
unemployed, it is quite soon for self-employment participants, and is probably too soon for the 
retraining of the employed and wage subsidy recipients.
Uses of performance monitoring results
A performance measurement system developed for ALMPs will have many uses for 
management, but the emphasis in these uses should always be on positive incentives rather than 
punitive action. Generally there are five principal uses:
(1) To preserve decentralized decision making about allocation of funds to various 
programs and service providers.
(2) To promote superior performance by counties, local offices, and service providers 
through positive incentives.
(3) To help identify and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or 
sanctions.
(4) To contribute information on performance to the funding allocation process used by 
the tri-partite National Labor Market Committee to allocate funds to the counties.
(5) To ensure compliance with legal requirements of programs.
The outcome found in Hungary that reemployment from individual retraining runs about 
five percentage points higher than for group retraining has influenced training program 
operations. Attention was drawn to alternative types of training by the performance monitoring 
system. In addition to reemployment rates, cost of reemployment was also a factor. It was 
observed that Budapest had used individual retraining at the near complete exclusion of group 
retraining, and that the cost per participant reemployed was very high. Budapest was encouraged 
to reconsider practices. Other areas also benefitted from management guidance from the 
National Labor Center.
Caveats on performance indicators
Since regions within a country vary in their economic strength, before using data on 
program performance in deciding budget allocation it is important to account for variations in the 
difficulty of finding reemployment. Consequently, an adjustment methodology for performance 
indicators is necessary. In addition to accounting for regional differences in reemployment 
prospects, the adjustment methodology may also provide an easy way to discourage "creaming" 
and ensure appropriate targeting of reemployment services.
Creaming refers to the practice of program administrators selecting the most qualified 
candidates for program participation so as to increase measured program success. The analogy is 
to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed off. Creaming is 
an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most able people get 
reemployment assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it might be 
otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of becoming reemployed even 
without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified applicants the program 
services might be the only realistic path to employment. 2
An appropriately designed adjustment methodology is an essential component of a 
performance management system. In addition to providing a level playing field for comparison
2Evidence of creaming in assignment to training in Hungary is provided by Godfrey, Lazar 
and O'Leaiy (1993) and by O'Leary (1997).
of inter-regional performance, and a means for discouraging creaming by program managers, an 
adjustment methodology can be used to encourage targeting of services to those who have 
particular difficulty in gaining reemployment, such as: the long term unemployed, those with low 
levels of formal education, and persons with physical handicaps. 3 Annex 2 to this report presents 
a technical discussion of how to develop an adjustment methodology for performance indicators. 
A properly designed adjustment methodology can be used to create incentives to prevent 
creaming and can provide for an even handed assessment of program performance across regions 
with differing labor market conditions.
4. Net Impact Estimation
The essential distinction of net impact estimation is that outcomes of program 
participants are judged relative to an appropriate comparison group. For employment programs 
this means that those personal characteristics which enable labor market success are roughly the 
same in the two groups. Appropriate comparison group specification can be achieved by proper 
sample selection or through statistical means. That is, either by classical field experiments or by 
quasi-experimental statistical methods. By taking care in estimation the process yields net rather 
than gross impacts. Net impacts are the proper indicator for judging the additional social value 
of an employment program.
Classically designed experiments are the ideal for net impact evaluation. If random 
assignment is achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods are not needed 
to obtain estimates of the net impact of a program. With large samples randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups 
should not differ on average, so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to the 
program. Program impact may be measured as the simple difference between the means of the 
samples of program participants and of control group members on measures of outcomes. 
Because this process is easy to understand, simple unadjusted net impact estimates from field 
experiments are usually very influential for the purpose of guiding policy.4
Naturally, field experiments are not without potential problems. The first type of 
problems are called internal validity problems. These include errors in conducting random 
assignment to treatment and control groups, and inconsistent experimental conditions. The first 
problem can lead to lack of homogeneity across groups, the second means that the same 
treatment was not applied in all cases. The second type of pitfall are called external validity 
problems. Time horizon effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that the
3O'Leary (1996) provides a simple example of how to develop and apply an adjustment 
methodology for employment programs.
4For examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field experiment, 
see Decker and O'Leary (1995).
experimental service is only temporary rather than permanent. Learning effects can take place 
within a community during the course of an experiment whereby the first enrollees act differently 
from those enrolled some time after the experiment begins. Hawthorne effects are responses to 
treatments not due to the content of service, but simply due to the special attention. 
Displacement effects which may be the most critical external validity concern occur when 
treatment subjects improve their outcome at the expense of others who are not part of the 
experiment.
When there is non-random assignment to either a program participant group or the 
comparison group, then statistical methods of correction must be used to offset the selection bias 
in order to properly estimate the net impact of a program. 5
Recent surveys of microeconomic evaluations of employment programs conducted by Fay 
(1996) for OECD member countries and by Meager and Evans (1998) for a selected group of 
countries emphasize the importance of accounting for deadweight loss and displacement effects 
when measuring the impact of the program. With a mixed bag of findings which reveal that the 
net impact of different Employment programs varies widely from one population subgroup to 
another, the authors of both surveys argued that targeting of services is crucial to maximizing the 
social dividend from public expenditure on employment programs. 6
It is crucial to account for displacement and substitution effects when assessing the net 
social benefits of public programs. However, these factors are irrelevant at the individual level 
and very difficult to measure at the social level. An evaluation design using a comparison group 
automatically accounts for possible deadweight loss by comparing employment program 
participants with otherwise similar non-participants. A subgroup analysis of net impact provides 
a basis for targeting employment programs.
5Such methods are called quasi-experimental because they attempt to mimic statistically the ideal 
of a true experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).
6That is for the following reasons. When an unemployed person participates in an Employment 
program which does not improve his/her chance of re-employment, there is a deadweight loss to 
society for the expenditure incurred. If a program manager practices creaming in selecting 
participants for Employment programs such that the people supported would have secured 
employment without the assistance, then a deadweight loss also results. When an Employment 
program participant gains re-employment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar job-seeker, 
then displacement has occurred. When an employer, either government or private, receives a subsidy 
to hire a worker who would otherwise have been hired anyway, then substitution of Employment 
program financing for other intended spending has occurred. Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide 
a clear example of how to estimate the employment effects of fiscal substitution in direct job creation 
programs. They maintain that the degree of substitution increases as a program matures.
Quasi-experimental evaluations are often done because they are much cheaper and can be 
done more quickly than classical experiments. They can often be done with existing 
administrative data which further reduces evaluation costs. This is often the case when there is a 
"natural experiment," which is an opportunity presented by a policy change or an economic 
event. The main problems with quasi-experimental net impact evaluations is adequately dealing 
with the problem of selection bias. This is a thorny issue which often requires complex statistical 
techniques to properly address. Such statistical complexity diminishes the policy value of the 
findings. Also, like experiment based net impact evaluations. The estimates only provide a 
snapshot photo at a point in time. This is distinct from the monitoring approach which gives 
consistent information covering a wide geographic area regularly over time.
To show the range of policy relevant outcomes which can be studied, we now examine 
net impacts of ALMPs in Hungary on employment, earnings, and receipt of unemployment 
compensation. Table 2 summarizes results for five separate outcomes.
Table 2. Net impact of ALMPs on employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation in Hungary___
EMPLOYED 1 EMPLNOW2 EARNNOW3 UCMONTHS4 UCPAY5
Individual retraining
Group retraining
Public service employment
Wage subsidy
S elf- employment
0.11**
0.09**
-0.26**
-0.11**
0.14
[ang^;-:.;:;>,:.; - :' ;': 
0.09**
0.07**
-0.21**
-0.06**
0.16
7
5**
9**
-6
-26
-0.68**
-0.50**
-0.19
0.04**
-1.64**
-43**
-27**
_Q**
7
-120
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test 
1 Ever re-employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment
* Employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date
3 Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
4 Months of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996
5 Amount of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996, in US$ at exchange rate of USS 1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints on 
1 April 1997, approximately the survey date
Source: O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998).__________________________________
Retraining and self-employment increase employment rates. Earnings appear to be 
boosted by group retraining and PSE, with no measurable effect from other programs. For 
unemployment compensation, retraining appears to reduce receipt by about one-half month while 
there appears to be even larger savings from self-employment assistance of more than 1.5 
months.
Subgroup analysis of net impacts
There are at least two reasons to examine program impacts by population subgroup. One 
is to provide information to policy makers who may consider targeting ALMPs to certain groups 
like those without a specialization or older unemployed persons. Another is to identify any 
possible biases in the effects a program that benefits only one gender or certain education level
groups may not be considered good policy even if it is cost effective. Table 3 presents the 
qualitative results of an analysis of ALMP impacts on important subgroups.
For neither individual nor group retraining were there marked differences by sex, age, 
education or occupational group. Subgroup analysis of participation in PSE indicated that 
participation was less likely to harm the re-employment chances of women, persons aged 45 
years or over, and the better-educated. The greatest benefit of the wage subsidy was felt by 
participants in areas of moderate unemployment. However, impacts of wage subsidies did not 
vary appreciably by sex, age, or prior occupational group. Self-employment assistance boosted 
re-employment rates most among participants aged 45 years and over, and those in areas of high 
unemployment.
Table 3. Summary of Subgroup Net Impact Analysis
Characteristic
Gender
Age
Education
Occupation
Unemployment 
Duration
Unemployment 
Rate
Retraining Public Service 
Employment
Worse for males
Worse for the 
less educated
Wage 
Subsidies
Best where 
unemployment 
is moderate
Self- 
employment
Best for older 
persons
Best where 
unemployment 
is high
Impacts of program features
Since ALMPs provided to unemployed job seekers are not homogenous, it is useful to 
investigate if variations in different observable dimensions of programs yields different impacts 
on the outcome measures for employment and earnings. Again drawing on the evaluation done 
in Hungary, Table 4 presents a qualitative summary of net impact estimates of various program 
features. As for the above discussion of subgroup impact estimates, all estimates presented apply 
to the outcome "currently employed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment" (EMPLNOW).
For both individual and group retraining in Hungary though the impact on employment 
was not significantly different from that for the complementary group it was greater for those 
who had contributed personally to the direct cost of individual retraining, for those in retraining 
for three months or less, and for those on courses involving 20 or fewer hours per week.
Participation in PSE work, which involves unskilled manual labor, appeared to be the 
greatest obstacle to future employment in a normal unsubsidized job or in self-employment, 
whereas non-manual and skilled manual work constituted the least impediment. There was no 
significant difference by the industry of activity in which PSE occurred, but the reintegration of 
ALMP participants into the normal work force appeared to be more successful for PSE in service 
employment than in other industries.
Table 4. Summary of Program Feature Net Impact Analysis
Feature
Share in costs
Duration of 
ALMP
Organized by
Level of skill
Industry
Sole proprietor 
vs. partnership
Retraining
Better with 
contribution 
(double but not 
stat. signif.)
3 to 12 months
Not district 
retraining center 
20+ hrs/w
Public Service 
Employment
Manual 
unskilled 
is worst
Wage 
Subsidies
Outside of 
construction and 
services
Self- 
employment
Outside of 
services
The skill level required in the job which was given a wage subsidy had no significant 
effect on the employment outcome. Judged by whether participants were in unsubsidized work or 
self-employment on the survey date, those whose subsidized work had been in construction or 
the services reaped the least advantage from the wage subsidy scheme.
Self-employment assistance recipients who pursued activities in services industry were 
the least likely to experience lasting employment effects. There was not a significant difference 
in employment outcomes for those who started sole versus partnership business activities.
Not a part of the program feature analysis, but an important indicator of program impact 
secondary employment effects of self-employment assistance in Hungary was also investigated. 
It was found that on the survey date 17.6 percent of those receiving assistance had hired at least 
one other worker. Indeed, one successful recipient claimed to have hired 12 workers. The mean 
number of workers employed by those who did recruit was 1.75, and the mean hired among all 
assistance recipients was 0.31. About half of hires had previously been unemployed.
Every ALMP has a variety of features and important outcomes. The presentation in this 
and the previous sections of chapter 4 are not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all 
outcomes or evaluation approaches possible. The analysis and examples were intended to be 
suggestive of the potential value of the net impact approach to program evaluation.
Uses of net impact estimates
In the previous chapter the point was made that net impact analysis is a supplement to 
performance monitoring. The latter being mainly a management tool and the former useful for 
policy development. There is much more overlap in use of the two sets of results than that 
division suggested. This section briefly discusses four uses of net impact estimates of ALMPs. 
The four are: (1) policy formulation, (2) targeting, (3) program management, and (4) 
accountability. In our exposition we hope to make clear the added value which net impact 
analysis provides to administrators, users, and decision makers of employment programs.
Policy formulation decisions concerning questions of whether to continue, expand, 
curtail, or cancel government employment programs should be well informed with objective 
information. Policy makers within labor ministries, national labor centers, and national 
legislatures often require information about the return on government spending the return on 
investment. The net benefits for programs may be assessed from different perspectives: society, 
individuals, government, and programs. Such a measurement requires estimates of the 
incremental value of programs in cost-benefit analysis.
To improve the overall cost effectiveness of programs and to increase the value to 
customers, it is useful to know what programs yield the greatest benefit for different clients. 
Subgroup analysis of program net impacts can provide exactly the information needed to do 
informed targeting of reemployment services. Such information is available no other way.
As emphasized in chapter 3, performance indicators systems are a valuable tool for 
program management. Such systems track gross outcomes and by themselves have no 
mechanism for establishing what is an adequate or superior level of performance. Net impact 
analysis can provide baseline standards for gross outcome performance monitoring systems.
Such standards can be used with an adjustment methodology system to set reasonable targets for 
regions on separate employment programs.
Spending of public funds for social improvement requires public accountability. Periodic 
reports to parliament, prime ministers, and voters are crucial for continuance. Either over the 
short term or the long term all spending programs are discretionary. Good programs only survive 
and flourish when credible evidence of value can be objectively demonstrated. The methods 
reviewed in this chapter provide strategies for determining which public efforts to promote 
employment provide the greatest value.
5. Conclusion
The main uses of evaluation results from performance monitoring of gross outcomes are 
program management and annual planning. That is, how to best arrange resources to gain the 
greatest value from existing programs. Net impact estimation based on a comparison group 
design is required to know the value added by a program. Such incremental estimates are useful 
for evaluating changes in program design, doing strategic program planning, and formulating 
policy. They can also aid in targeting services to specific groups and in identifying program 
features to expand, continue, or curtail.
It should be recognized however that the decision to implement, continue, or cancel 
programs for labor market support also has a political dimension. During a period of dramatic 
change in conditions of employment security, there can be an irresistible political imperative for 
ALMPs. In such times, the rules for return on investment cannot be blindly applied without 
regard for social stability, however difficult that may be to quantify.
Aside from their net impact, ALMPs have a direct effect of easing labor market tensions 
because of the simple fact that those taking part in ALMPs are not counted as unemployed during 
their participation. In Hungary during the mid-1990s for example, participation in ALMPs 
reduced measured unemployment by 2 percentage points below what it would otherwise have 
been. Furthermore, while ALMP participation does not always immediately result in stable re- 
employment, for individual program participants the experience serves at least to interrupt an 
otherwise continuous spell of unemployment.
In times when unemployment is high and the demand for labor is low, we should not 
expect uniformly high net impacts from ALMPs. However, the examples from Hungary reported 
here highlight the importance of carefully assessing active labor market programs so that public 
funds can be utilized as efficiently as possible while pursuing the social goal of returning the 
unemployed to gainful work.
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2. Concepts in Evaluation
Gross outcomes, gross impacts, and net impacts 
An example: Rate of Reemployment
Program participants: 60% 
Among all unemployed: 40% 
Among matched pairs group: 50%
Gross outcome of program: 60%
Gross impact of program: 60% - 40% = 20%
Net impact of program: 60% - 50% = 10%
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2. Concepts in Evaluation-continued 
Performance monitoring
Net impact estimation
- Classically designed experiments
- Quasi-experimental econometric studies
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3. Performance Monitoring
Process:
Nation-wide involvement
Set goals
Agree on performance indicators
Consensus building-ownership
Iterative
Appeal:
Develop an information system 
Culture of cost effectiveness 
Professionalism in employment service 
Establish survey skills 
Foundation for evaluation
Problems:
Response rates 
Data tampering 
Creaming (Response-adjustment)
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Examples from Hungary-Performance Indicators
Table 1. An example of performance measurement in Hungary.
Percent employed at follow-up after various ALMPs, 1994-1998.
ALMP
Group Retraining (A 12)
Individual Retraining (A22)
Retraining Employed (A3 2)
Self-employment (B2)
Wage Subsidy (C2)
PSE (D2)
1994
44.9
58.5
82.2
91.9
71.1
3.5
1995
36.1
42.2
93.6
90.6
71.4
1.3
1996
44.5
51.9
92.8
90.2
70.1
1.3
1997
46.3
51.1
90.4
88.1
66.3
1.9
1998
46.8
51.5
94.7
91.7
59.1
1.9
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4. Net impact estimation
- Classically designed experiments 
Process:
Random assignment
Repeating experimental conditions
Large sample sizes
Appeal:
Simplicity of interpreting results 
Model free impact estimates
Problems:
Internal Validity
Errors in random assignment 
Inconsistent experimental conditions
External Validity
Time horizon 
Learning effects 
Displacement effects
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4. Net impact estimation-continued
-Quasi-experimental Econometric Studies 
Process (Statistically mimic an experiment):
Administrative Data 
Demonstration 
"Natural Experiment" 
Surveys 
Simulation
Appeal:
Inexpensive 
Timely
Problems:
Selection Bias
Statistical Complexity
"A Snapshot" at a point in time
Examples from Hungary
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Examples from Hungary-Net Impact Estimates
Table 2. Net impact of ALMPs on employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation in Hungary
EMPLOYED 1 EMPLNOW2 EARNNOW3 UCMONTHS4 UCPAY5
Hungary
Individual retraining
Group retraining
Public service employment
Wage subsidy
Self-employment
0.11**
0.09**
-0.26**
-0.11**
0.14
0.09**
0.07**
-0.21**
-0.06**
0.16
7
5**
9**
-6
-26
-0.68**
-0.50**
-0.19
0.04**
-1.64**
-43**
-27**
.9**
7
-120
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
1 Ever re-employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment
2 Employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date
3 Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
4 Months of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996
5 Amount of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996, in US$ at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints on 
1 April 1997, approximately the survey date
Source: O'Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998)._______________________________
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Table 3. Summan
Characteristic
Gender
Age
Education
Occupation
Unemployment 
Duration
Unemployment 
Rate
Y of Subgroup Net Impact Analysis
Retraining Public Service 
Employment
Worse for males
Worse for the 
less educated
Wage 
Subsidies
Best where 
unemployment 
is moderate
Self- 
employment
Best for older 
persons
Best where 
unemployment 
is high
Table 4. Summan
Feature
Share in costs
Duration of 
ALMP
Organized by
Level of skill
Industry
Sole proprietor 
vs. partnership
y of Program Feature Net Impact Analysis
Retraining
Better with 
contribution 
(but not signif.)
3 to 12 months
Not district 
retraining center 
20+ hrs/w
Public Service 
Employment
Manual 
unskilled 
is worst
Wage 
Subsidies
Outside of 
construction and 
services
Self- 
employment
Outside of 
services
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5. Conclusion
Uses of Evaluation Results
- Performance monitoring 
Program management 
Annual planning
- Net impact estimation 
Program design 
Strategic planning 
Policy formulation
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research
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5. Conclusion-continued
A Sequence for Evaluation
- Management information system
- Performance indicators monitoring
- A culture of cost effectiveness
- Professionalism in the employment service
- Net impact evaluation
- Policy development
W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research
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